Excerpt from Captain Johann Ewald's Journal

 

The 21st of October. About three o’clock in the morning the Jäger Corps marched to Cooper’s Ferry on the Delaware. The Corps crossed the Delaware in flatboats with the three Hessian grenadier battalions, Linsing, Minnigerode, and Lengerke, along with the Mirbach Regiment under Colonel Schieck, and landed about eight o’clock in the Province of Jersey.

I had the advanced guard with sixty jägers, followed by the Corps, the Minnigerode battalion, the Mirbach Regiment, two 6-pounders, two howitzers, the Lengerke and Linsing battalions, and Captain Lorey with twenty mounted jägers. This corps, under Colonel Donop, was ordered to seize by force Fort Red Bank, through which the garrison on Mud Island maintained its communication with the mainland. Colonel Donop volunteered for this expedition.

This corps was still less than a half an hour away from the Delaware when it ran into an enemy party in the vicinity of Newton Township, which withdrew over Cooper’s Bridge toward Burlington. I pursued it up to the end of a wood, where I discovered several hundred men on both sides of Cooper’s Creek, with whom I skirmished until about four o’clock in the afternoon, after which time they withdrew. The colonel, who continued his march with the corps, had ordered me to occupy myself with the enemy until nightfall, and then to follow the corps to Haddonfield. He wanted to mislead the enemy and conceal his march. At eight o’clock in the evening I arrived at Haddonfield, where I found the corps encamped in a quadrangle on the heights.

On the morning of the 22d, about four o’clock, the corps marched toward Red Bank in the same formation as yesterday, with the slight difference that I formed the rear guard with my company.

About nine o’clock we crossed the pass over Timber Creek, which has very marshy banks. A dam of several hundred paces extends across the creek, on which there are two wooden bridges. Two small plantations are situated on this and the other side. I was surprised that we did not leave here at least one jäger company to retain the mastery of this pass, since, after all, the success of our expedition was not yet assured. To be sure, there were the two battalions of light infantry ready for the Jersey post at Cooper’s Ferry, but they could not help much if Washington had gotten wind of this expedition, passed a strong corps across the Delaware, and stationed it at Timber Creek.

Our march went past Strawberry Bank. About one o’clock in the afternoon the corps arrived in a wood which encircled the left side of the fort at rifle-shot distance to the left bank of the Delaware. In this wood a captain and six men from the garrison of the fort fell into the hands of Captain Wreden, who had the advanced guard. They had been ordered to get fresh meat at a plantation and knew nothing of our approach.

The entire corps remained in column on the road in the wood. The men were permitted to sit down and told to eat, but since this day was not bread and provision day, very few had any bread to break or bite. The officers, especially, were not provided with anything. I had to march with the rear guard to the head of the corps.

During this time Colonel Donop, along with Colonel Stuart (who accompanied this expedition as a volunteer), Major Pauli, and Captain Krug of the Hessian artillery, had already reconnoitered the fort when I reached the corps. As soon as I arrived, the colonel ordered me to inspect the fort and to give him my opinion.

I approached the fort up to rifle-shot range and found that it was provided with a breastwork twelve feet high, palisaded and dressed with assault stakes.

On my way back, I met Colonel Stuart with a drummer who was to summon the fort, and right behind them I met Major Pauli, Captain Krug, and both adjutants of the colonel. All these gentlemen regarded the affair with levity. The only man who had any real knowledge, and looked upon the business as serious, was worthy old Captain Krug. I took this man aside and asked him what he thought of the undertaking, whereupon he answered: “He who has seen forts or fortified places captured with sword in hand will not regard this affair as a small matter, if the garrison puts up a fight and has a resolute commandant. We have let luck slip through our fingers. We should not have summoned the fort, but immediately taken it by surprise, for no one knew of our arrival. But now they will make themselves ready, and if our preparations are not being made better than I hear, we will get a good beating.”

After a lapse of a half an hour, Colonel Stuart returned with the following reply: “Colonel Greene, who commands the fort, sends his compliments and he shall await Colonel Donop.”

After this news, which the colonel did not expect, a hundred fascines were made at once by the battalions, and a battery of six regimental pieces [3-pounders], two 6-pounders, and the howitzers were mounted in the wood at rifle-shot distance from the fort. The Linsing Battalion under Captain Stamford (for Colonel Linsing had stomach pains at this time) was to make the attack against the left, the Regiment von Mirbach against the center, and the Minnigerode Battalion on the bastion to the left at the Delaware. The Lengerke Battalion was stationed at the Delaware to cover the rear against an enemy landing. One hundred men from each battalion were to carry the fascines, and march in a line at a distance of two hundred paces in front of the battalion. With these the ditch was to be filled, crossed, and the fort scaled with sword in hand. I placed sixteen good marksmen at the edge of the wood in the vicinity of the battery,
who were to shoot at those men who showed themselves on the parapet.

This was the order which was given, and no one thought about axes or saws with which the obstructions and palisades could be cut down.

The battery began to play, and the three battalions advanced against the fort with indescribable courage. But they were received so hotly by the garrison, and by the vessels which had moved into position during the summons to rake the fort’s flank, that they were repelled with great loss, although several officers and a number of grenadiers scaled the breastwork. Colonel Donop himself and his adjutant, Captain Wagner, were mortally wounded at the edge of the ditch. Captain Stamford, who commanded the Linsing Battalion, was shot through the chest; Minnigerode through both legs; and the gallant Colonel Schieck, who commanded the Regiment von Mirbach, was shot dead at the barred gate. Night ended the battle, and the attacking corps reassembled at the spot from which it had departed for the attack.

Colonel Wurmb immediately ordered the Jäger Corps to move up to the edge of the wood to cover the retreat. He personally took the Grenadier Battalion Lengerke, which had protected the rear in case an enemy party had landed from the ships, and hurried with the battalion to the pass of the Timber Creek
bridge to occupy it.

Since we had flattered ourselves in advance with a successful surrender, no retreat then was thought of, and no wagons brought to transport the wounded. The seriously wounded officers were carried on the guns and horses, and all the privates who could not drag themselves away on their wounded limbs fell into enemy hands. But since the enemy took the retreat for a trap, and had expected a new attack during the night, the men had to remain on the battlefield a whole night in the most deplorable condition without the slightest care, whereby the majority died of their wounds.

About midnight the entire corps arrived on the other side of Timber Creek, where arrangements were made at once to obtain wagons for transporting the wounded officers to Philadelphia. At eight o’clock in the morning the corps set out again, and crossed the Delaware during the night. The three grenadier battalions moved into cantonment quarters on the outskirts of Philadelphia; the Mirbach Regiment joined the line of the army; and the Jäger Corps returned to its post at the Morris house, where it arrived after midnight.

The loss in dead consisted of:
 Regiment von Mirbach
Colonel Schieck
Captain Bogatsky
Lieutenant Riemann
Lieutenant Wurmb

Grenadier Battalion Linsing
Lieutenant du Puy
Lieutenant Groening

Grenadier Battalion Minnigerode
Lieutenant Hille
Lieutenant Offenbach

and 143 noncommissioned officers and privates

The wounded consisted of:
Colonel Donop, right leg shot apart; captured.
Captain and Adjutant Wagner, both legs shot to pieces; captured.
Colonel Minnigerode, shot through both legs.
Captain Stamford, shot through the chest and right leg.
Captain Wachs, through the right leg, von Minnigerode.
Captain Hendorff, in the arm, von Minnigerode.
Captain Schotten, right arm shot off, von Mirbach.
Lieutenant Rodemann, through the left leg, von Linsing.
Lieutenant Waitz, through the neck and in the head, von Linsing.
Lieutenant Rieffer, left foot smashed, von Mirbach.
Lieutenant Berner, right leg shot to pieces, von Mirbach.
Lieutenant Gottschall, right knee smashed; captured; von Linsing.
Lieutenant Heymel, in the left knee; captured; von Minnigerode.

And 253 noncommissioned officers and privates, of whom not thirty men are convalescing.

This day was especially sad for me. I lost five of my oldest friends, among whom was a relative, and four of my best friends were severely wounded. As long as I have served, I have not yet left a battlefield in such deep sorrow.

The principal mistakes of the attack were as follows:

 1. We should not have summoned the fort, but attacked as soon as we arrived. Through this mistake the garrison was alerted, and the armed vessels gained time to draw near for the defense.

2. The plan of attack itself was faulty. We ought to have made the feint attack where the Linsing Battalion attacked, and the real attack in full strength there where the Minnigerode Battalion attacked, because we were covered on this side by the wood up to musket-shot range.

Moreover, the men who carried the fascines in a line should have marched in column around to one spot to fill up the ditch; as it was, the men merely threw the fascines in the ditch and no purpose was served. From my experience, the attack ought to have been made in the following manner:

An officer with twenty men, dispersed, should try to gain the outer edge of the ditch, where they continue to advance as well as fire upon those who are defending the breastwork.

At a distance of one hundred and fifty paces, an officer and fifty men must follow in column, who carry the fascines on their heads, and of whom ten to twenty men are provided with axes. These men carry their weapons over their shoulders. As soon as they arrive at the outer edge of the ditch, they through their fascines into the ditch so that it is filled in to a breadth of four to six feet. As soon as this happens, they jump into the ditch and those supplied with axes cut down the palisades and obstructions and attempt to climb up the breastwork, but remain on the berm.

A battalion follows at a distance of two hundred paces, which likewise approaches the ditch at quick step, crosses the bridge of fascines, and spreads out in the ditch. As soon as they have done this, they climb up the breastwork. The two wing companies remain on the berm and try to drive the enemy away from the parapet by their fire. The two middlemost companies scale the parapet, jump into the work, and attempt to overcome the garrison with the bayonet.

The second battalion follows at a distance of three hundred paces, which, if the first should be repulsed, then repeats the attack.

An attack in this manner surely would be successful, since it has vigor; and the Americans could not repel it as cheaply as they did, for they are said to have lost less than fifty men.

On the whole, this attack belongs to the quixotic variety, which occurs in wars at times. For it was impossible to capture this work without the aid of armed ships, which it had to be assigned to drive away the enemy vessels. But this was impossible, because the Americans had constructed very
skillful chevaux-de-frise below Mud Island in the Delaware, where the entrance was blocked with a very thick chain.

In fact, the colonel was supposed to postpone his attack until the next day, the 23d, if he could not take the fort by surprise. On that day, two warships were to approach the chevaux-de-frise as closely as possible to drive away the enemy vessels by their fire. This occurred according to plan. The ships were the AUGUSTA, 64 guns, and the sloop MERLIN, 18 guns. But to magnify the misfortune, the Augusta ran into a sunkenchevaux-de-frise and her captain had to blow up the ship, whereby an officer and twenty-six men perished in a boat that was sunk by the enemy.

And I suppose, too, that had we captured the fort, we would not have dared show ourselves in it because it was exposed to the water, and the enemy frigates and galleys could bombard it. We could, of course, mount batteries to drive away the ships, but heavy guns were necessary for this, and the heavy artillery of the army was already employed. But the attack took place to cut off the enemy’s communication with the Province of Jersey, which could also be done by a blockade.

In a word, Colonel Donop was a man of action. He had compared the siege of Mud Island with those of Bergen op Zoom and Olmütz, and had offered to capture Fort Red Bank with one grenadier battalion, which offended the pride of the English. They led him into danger and he fell, where so many men— indeed, so many really brave men—had to bit the dust.